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We examine the role played by information in shaping popular expectations in the process of political
mobilization, and the development of revolutionary movements in particular. The vast majority of the people face
the trade-off between the ‘risky’ option of joining the revolutionary movement and the ‘safe’ option of supporting
the present regime. The largemajority of the people are influenced by the expectations of a successful campaign of
either political side. Only if the expected or perceived support for the opposition exceeds a critical mass, does the
revolution become effective.We show that the growth-dynamics of revolutionarymovements heavily depends on
the parameters determining the perception of the actual state of support. And, we will argue that it is the
informational aspect that provides the necessary bias to get out of the self-confirming outsider position. Especially,
as we argue, it provides an explanation for the symbolic violence used by terrorist groups as it serves them as an
instrument by which the mobilization dynamics is turned into a format where information has the largest impact.
Surprisingly, this will in general be the situation where a majority of the people dissents from the acts of terror.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
We follow Schelling (1978) and Granovetter (1978) in assuming that the typical revolutionary
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equilibrium (the hard core), an intermediate unstable equilibrium and a high stable equilibrium.
This model reflects an early mobilization problem of revolutionary groups: until it has
established an effective base of support, it is unlikely to survive, but as long as it hasn't arrived
at a threshold initializing a bandwagon effect, it will be unlikely to establish a surviving base of
support.
Kuran (1989, 1991a,b) suggests that the early mobilization problem will only be resolved
through a catalytic event This event will serve as a spark that will result in a dramatic change of
support for the revolutionaries and catapult it beyond the threshold. This spark, he notes, is often
difficult to discern, explaining why revolutionary outbreaks seem to ‘appear out of nowhere’.
Lohmann (1993, 1994a,b) observes that much political action (and in particular, demon-
strations) is a means of signaling: most individuals are ignorant of the true state of the world (e.g.,
how many people support a revolutionary group), and demonstrations serve to deliver this
information. The present paper offers an explanation of sparks by an explicit analysis of the
dynamic adjustment process from one state of the world to another. We think of the adjustment
process as the result of two subsequent steps: (1) formation of beliefs about the true state of the
world — the information component, and (2) a bandwagon effect depending on the belief — the
preference component.
(1) In the first step people perceive the true state of the world. This perception significantly
depends on the level of information which forms their belief. In case of full information the
believed state of the world is identical to the true state of the world. However, with
decreasing quality of information, distortion effects are likely to occur in the sense that
deviations from the true state as the believed state of the world may be expected.
(2) The behavioral component specifies how agents respond to a (believed) state of the world.
We define the response function which represents the cumulative responsiveness and
measures the willingness to join the group subject to the (believed) share of the people who
have already made the decision to sign on.
2. A dynamic model of mass-mobilization
A characteristic of revolutions is the small time-scale at which they occur. Some of them, like
the French Revolution, take everybody by surprise, leaving political scientists and historians
with the question of how to explain these unforeseen events. Kuran (1989) lists a couple of
reasons that could serve as a powerful cocktail, triggering the developments as they in fact occur.
Reasons leading a revolutionary movement to overthrow the establishment may be due to effects
induced as part of a strategic choice on either side; others appear more or less coincidental.
Though the literature uses arguments that would ask for a dynamical framework, these dynamics
are never made explicit. This paper can be considered as a generalization of the dynamics that
are first introduced by Granovetter (1978) and further treated by McCormick and Owen (1996).
First we will describe these deterministic dynamics, which will give food for thought and lead us
to adapt the model that would best fit the description of a discrete time/continuous state Markov
process.
The present article discusses the process of mass-mobilization as resulting from a threshold
function, i.e., a function f:[0,1]→ [0,1] that relates each fraction of the people that is believed to
support the opposition to the fraction of the people that will join on the basis of this information.
Below we will call the fraction of people that, at time t, stands firm for the opposition and gives
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states can be formulated in terms of the evolution of the system
xo ¼ d
xtþ1 ¼ f ðxtÞ ð1Þ
where δ is taken as the initial true state. As is suggested by Granovetter (1978), Kuran (1989) and
McCormick and Owen (1996), the mapping f is typically an increasing and continuous mapping
with an S-shaped graph. Belowwewill interpret its shape as the way the masses are spread over the
political spectrum represented by the interval [0,1], where 0 means showing openly complete
loyalty to the opposition (revolutionaries) and 1 stands for being extremely loyal to the group
representing the public power, i.e., regime or government. The S-shape is motivated as follows.
Joining a revolutionary movement when it is small is a risky and hazardous undertaking. If it is not
believed that there are sufficiently many individuals joining to be successful in establishing the
goals of the opposition, the majority of people would rather refrain from giving support to the party
that is most likely going to lose. On the other hand, if the revolutionaries have a majority support,
regime adepts may choose to support the revolution as a second best option. This models the
situation that most people have populist preferences, which lead them to join those that they
believe to be leading, even if not the most preferred party.
Note that we are dealing with a universeΩ of all citizens, or at least of all citizens who can actually
contribute in some way to the insurgency. N, the number of these, is of the order of 10,000 or larger
(most likely, of the order of several million). Now, each individual, on the basis of his beliefs
(subjective probabilities) and preferences (utility function) will decidewhether to join the insurgency.
Essentially, individual i assigns utilities to the four cases
e1=Insurgency wins, i does not join
e2=Insurgency wins, i joins
e3=Insurgency loses, i does not join
e4=Insurgency loses, i joins
We can expect that i would rather be on the winning side, and so u(e2)Nu(e1), and u(e3)Nu
(e4).
Suppose, now, that this individual believes that a fraction x of the population supports the
insurgency. He then assigns probability π(x) – which is an increasing function of x – to the event:
Insurgency wins. Now, the individual will join the insurgency if the expected utility of doing so
will exceed the utility of not joining, i.e., if
pðxÞuðe2Þ þ ð1 pðxÞÞuðe4ÞNpðxÞuðe1Þ þ ð1 pðxÞÞuðe3Þ
Some algebra reduces this condition to
pðxÞN  uðe3Þ  uðe4Þ
uðe2Þ  uðe1Þ þ uðe3Þ  uðe4Þ
Now π is a strictly increasing function of x. Thus, the value of x, call it ζ, which makes the two
sides of this last inequality equal is a threshold for the individual: the individual will join the
insurgency if xNζ. Since the utilities are individual and the subjective probabilities, π, are
individual, this ζ is an individual threshold, ζ(i).
Fig. 1. An S-shaped reaction curve.
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f ðxÞ ¼ ♯fiaXjfðiÞbxg=N
A typical S-shaped threshold function is depicted in Fig. 1.
Observe that the graph of the function f intersects the graph of the identity function on [0,1].1
Such points are restpoints for the dynamics as, for each such point x, the relation x= f(x) holds. In
the above figure there are three of them, say xLbxMbxH. The fraction xL stands for the
equilibrium fraction of the people who would constitute the small and stable part of the people
that remains as a support if the initial state is (chosen to be) smaller than xM. If xONxM then the
true state of the world rapidly converges towards xH, the scenario at which revolution is most
likely to occur, as the opposition may count on large support. Needless to say, though xMmay be a
restpoint, it is an unstable one and will generically not occur.
We differ in our approach from the present literature in that we distinguish between two
different aspects of the mass-mobilization process: (1) First, at time t people develop a perception
of the true state of the world b(xt), the believed state conditional on the true state at t, xt, and (2)
society reacts to b(xt) with r(b(xt)), the fraction of people that would give support to the
opposition if it is commonly believed that a fraction b(xt) is doing so. In particular, this means that
the relevant dynamics of mass-mobilization are summarized by the composite mapping r°b. The
deterministic model is contained in this general version of dynamics with f as reaction function
and b(x)=x for all x; people are reacting to the true state as if it were known. In our model,
however, beliefs about the true state are explicitly modeled as we will argue that full information
about the true state of the world is impossible to achieve. Besides that, Kuran (1989) mentions
already information about the true state of the world as one of the factors having significant
impact on the evolutionary processes in politics. Lohmann (1993, 1994a,b) also points out the
important role that information (or, for that matter, disinformation) plays in such processes.
A lack of information may be due to different causes, which we will classify as exogenous and
endogenous factors. The exogenous factors find their origin in the problem of knowing the actual
state of the world due to physical as well as mental constraints; the perception of the true state is1In particular the continuity of f together with Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem guarantees the existence of points of intersection.
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others' thoughts. In such case the best knowledge consists of an estimate of revolutionary activity
only, as for example can be derived via interviews and polls in the (independent) media.
The endogenous factors leading to incomplete information are due to the roles of the two
competing parties. For instance, as far as clandestine operating revolutionary groups are
concerned, the informational impact is substantial due to their very nature. The repressive force of
the regime will make it impossible for revolutionary groups to operate in the open and highlight
their state of being, which underlines the fact that it is this information that finds itself at the very
heart of the game that is played between the adversaries. Below we will show how distortion of
information about the true state may well form part of a propaganda campaign on either side as a
combination of effects is shown to shape the people's preferences, which then consequently may
sharpen the bandwagon-effect.
Thus, for both type of reasons, individuals in society are able to retrieve partial information
only and therefore imperfect competence for detecting the true level of membership resides.2
This deformation of knowledge about the true level of support for revolution is structural for all,
even for the members of a revolutionary movement as an open declaration of support for a
clandestine group may involve high risks of getting arrested. Despite the impossibility of
knowing the true state of support we will assume that people form beliefs about the true state
instead. Then this is exactly the informational aspect that we will model by the component b. For
instance, one might think of b as taking a sample from the distribution induced by the true state.
Then component r represents the behavioral part of the process and describes the bandwagon
effect subject to b(xt).
3. Research questions
This study will try to shed light on the role of both components in the mobilization dynamics,
and, in particular, the interplay between noisy beliefs of states and the people's reaction to that.
We will aim at answering the following questions, if possible.
1. Does information affect the dynamic process? If so, how sensitive are these results with respect
to the level of information? Does information change the stability of fixed points of the
threshold function that are used as predicted end-states by earlier mentioned literature? How
stable are these equilibria under the stochastic dynamics?
2. The spread of the believed state around the true state depends on exogenous as well as
endogenous factors. The exogenous part is explained by physical constraints to know the
actual state of the world. The endogenous factors are determined by the adversaries, each of
which could try to influence public opinion by the use of (distorted) information. Then can we
say something about the impact of information as part of a propaganda campaign. If it is
possible to shape peoples preferences through information, how could it be deployed as an
instrument to counter the influence of terrorist activities?
3. The paradox of terrorism is that each attack seems to underline that the public opinion is
against them. Does our model provide insights as to why it could be profitable for terrorists to
use such strategy?2From an informational aspect this is the problem considered by Condorcet (1785).
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Can we learn something from the theory of this kind of systems?
4. The role of information on the system dynamics
4.1. Going from real state to believed state
Above we argued that the assumption of full information seems far too stringent for our
purposes. Moreover, though the corresponding dynamics
xtþ1 ¼ f ðxtÞ ð2Þ
may be used to motivate the evolutionary pressure towards one of the stable equilibria, it does not
serve our goal in explaining why it is possible that revolts actually occur as it would only endorse
the salient point that marks the beginning of a revolutionary group.
Suppose that at a certain moment the real state is x∈ [0,1]. We model the perceived or believed
state as a random variable B(x) with values in [0, 1]. Hence we model the dynamics as if society is
represented by an agent whose random belief is distributed around the true state of the world3. As
a first approach we make the following assumptions:
1. Believed states are conditional upon the true state x.
2. The closer a state is to the true state x, the more likely this will be perceived as the true state4.
This idea is implemented by our choice of probability density functions for B(x), which all
attain maximal values around x.
3. We take the standard deviation τ of B(x) as a measure of information, in the sense that
decreasing τ reshapes the density function in favor of knowing the true value of x.
From here there are as many ways to proceed as the number of probability distributions that
would fit our desiderata. For analytical convenience we will restrict ourselves to a family of
cumulative probability functions that we will subsequently refer to as polynomial. This family is
rich enough to capture the main features of our model and, as it turns out, our main findings may
be replicated using other intuitive families of distribution. Fig. 2 below shows the typical shape of
the probability density function (PDF) and cumulative density function (CDF) for this class of
distributions.3A good question is as to why society can be represented by a single agent, i.e., do individuals all receive the same signal? It
might be more realistic to think of each individual i’s signal as consisting of the sum of two components, w+vi, where w is
common to all society's members, and vi is a personal signal; these vi could then be independent. In that case, it is the social
component w that gives rise to variability in the outcome: since N (the size of our population) is considered large, then,
contingent onw, it would be possible to give relatively small confidence intervals for the fraction of the population that elects to
join the insurgency. If, for example, we haveN=40,000, and our calculations tell us that, for a givenw, the expected fraction is
0.437, then we can have 95% confidence that the actual number of individuals is between 0.432 N and 0.442 N.
4Admittedly, this might not be the case. For example, we might consider the case of a regime that controls means of
communication, and is of course interested in making the insurgency look as weak as possible. In that case, the believed
state B(x) would probably be considerably for smaller than x. We will simply point out that, in such a case, the
calculations/simulations would be carried out essentially as they are in our present paper, though of course the results
would be different (we would find that the insurgency is much less likely to succeed). We reserve this for a later paper.
Fig. 2. Examples of gx,c and Gx,c for different combinations of (x,c).
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Here we will introduce the distribution corresponding to B(x), the belief about the true state
conditional on x. Given x∈ [0,1] and constant cN0, define the function gx,c by
gx;cðyÞ ¼ 15ðx
2  c2  2xyþ y2Þ2
16c5
if ya½x c; xþ c; ð3Þ
0 otherwise.
Then gx,c defines a probability density function on [0,1] so long as [x−c, x+c]⊂ [0,1] since it




By symmetry x is the mean of the distribution. Below we will assume that gx,c describes the
distribution of the believed state B(x). Then its variance is given by
Var ðBðxÞÞ ¼ E½ðBðxÞ  xÞ2 ¼
Z 1
0
ðy xÞ2gx;cðyÞdy ¼ c2=7 ð4Þ
So we may interpret c as a measure of the information about the true state as the standard
deviation is given, for such combinations of x and c, by c/√7. As c goes to zero, all the probability
mass is centered at x which in the limit is equivalent to truly knowing x.
For values of x and c such that x−cb0 or x+cN1 we may still use the function gx,c in order to
construct a cumulative probability density function by adding point masses in an appropriate way.
In general, x,c∈ [0,1] we define the cumulative probability density function Gx,c:[0,1]→ [0,1] by
Gx;cðyÞ ¼
R y
xc gx;cðsÞds if 0V yb1
1 if y ¼ 1
ð5Þ
Fig. 2 shows the graphs of the functions g.5,.5 ,g.3,.2, and g.3,.6 together with corresponding
cumulative density functions. The mappings g.5,.5 and g.3,.2 are the PDF's corresponding to G.5,.5
and G.3,.2. Note that according to G.3,.6 there is a fraction G.3,.6(0) – approx. 0.10 – of people that
denies the existence of people in support of the revolution. In case xbc the mean of the
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of the distribution corresponding to CDF G.3,.6 is approximately 0.31N .3.
4.3. Going from believed state to reaction on believed state
At this point, we will assume that the threshold or reaction function has an S-shaped graph, just as
sketched in Fig. 1.However, in order to focus on information effects only themodel is treatedwhere the
reaction function has a graph that is point-symmetric in (0.5, 0.5). In particular, we use the following rσ:
rrðxÞ¼aþð12aÞUf0:5;rgðxÞ; for xa½0;1:
Here Φ{.5, σ} is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) corresponding to the normal
distribution with mean .5 and standard deviation σ. For small σ, the number α represents the
fraction of the people that can be considered hardcore revolutionaries as they will join the
opposition, irrespective of the actual support. Notice that, by symmetry considerations, there is
also a fraction α of people that would always be in favor of the established regime. In all the
examples below the value α=0.1 is assumed. Note, as in the second graph in Fig. 3, an increase in
σ leads to a slightly increased fraction of hardcore membership.
The steepness of the curve around 0.5 indicates how many people are – more or less-
opportunists. The heap of mass in the middle of the spectrum indicates that there are plenty of
people who will just join any party, just as long as they believe it will be successful in achieving
the majority. This is illustrated in Fig. 3 which shows the graphs of rσ for six different values of σ.
An increase in σ goes hand in hand with an increasing spread of the people over the political
spectrum— at least in terms of willingness to support the revolutionary movement. To stress the
difference in the spread of the political spectrum and that of the information we will frequently use
σr as parameter included in the definition of rσ.
5. Experimental set-up
5.1. Results
By running simulations we create non-linear time-series from which we may learn two things:
1. The long-term distributions of the states of the system. In the deterministic case the system will
lock in, as (generically) the system will converge to one of the stable equilibria; whichFig. 3. Different reaction curves, σ=.03, .1, .17, .26, .32, .35. With increasing σ the graph is becoming less steep at x=.5.
Fig. 4. Calculated equilibria as function of σ.
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about the believed state allows the system to jump out of the deterministically stable states.
Then the question is whether these restpoints may still be seen as restpoints for the dynamics,
i.e. whether the system returns arbitrarily often to sufficiently nearby points.
2. The time it would take the system to jump from the status quo, which is taken to be about the left
lower equilibrium, to a state exceeding state x=.5. This would be the time that a revolutionary
movement would need to get assured of the support of at least half of the population. In this
respect we adhere to the approach ofKuran (1989, p54)who calls 'a shift in collective sentiment a
revolution if it exceeds .5 units'. In this manner we are able to distinguish between processes
yielding the same long-term distributions of the states, but which not are equally volatile. The
issue of time-scale is just as relevant in this study as it is in evolution theory: where it is a stylized
fact in politics that one regimewill be followed by another, there is less to say about the speed and
the frequency of transitions. Long-time distributions may not provide the desired insight into the
likeliness that a revolt will occur in a certain period-jumping times will.
Note, however, that our system dynamics show all characteristics of a discrete-time
continuous-state Markov process5 which guarantees the existence of limiting long term
distributions, both of the states of the system and of the jumping times. Nevertheless, these are
theoretically given and in general hard to calculate precisely. Given the type of distributions we
use, a better idea is to use simulation techniques and obtain approximate results. We will show
that even with a relatively small number of rounds of simulations one is able to notice clear-cut
differences in the characteristics of the dynamics, which was set out as our goal.
We ran the simulations inMathematica. First a pseudo-random generator is used to draw from
a uniform distribution on [0, 1] and subsequently the obtained random numbers are transformed in
such a way that the combined process yields the desired probability distribution. For details, see
Appendix A.
5.2. Long-run distribution of states
Below we comment on the results for several runs of the above algorithm, each with different
combination of c and σr. Each run consists of 10
5 iterations, the results of which are graphically
presented in Appendix B.5See, e.g., Gikhman and Skorokhod (1969).
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obtained from the simulations with the qualitative properties of the deterministic dynamics (1)
with f= rσ. We will treat the latter more extensively before discussing our main findings.
5.3. Steady states of the deterministic system
First we give a qualitative description for the deterministic dynamics in terms of the
equilibrium states. Fig. 3 shows that for low values of σr there are three restpoints for the
dynamics, a low (stable) equilibrium state xL(σr), a high (stable) equilibrium state xH(σr) and an
unstable restpoint xM(σr)= .5. For values of σr around .32 the S-shape almost coincides with the
45° line.
Fig. 10 shows that for σr=.30, the curve still intersects the diagonal three times, whereas for
σr=.33 there is just one point of intersection. Qualitatively, this means that hereabouts there is a
bifurcation value σr⁎: as σr approaches σr⁎ from below, the two stable equilibria contract into the
single stable state xM(σr)= .5. Fig. 4 depicts the graphs of the equilibrium states for the
deterministic dynamic as a function of σr.
5.4. Steady states of the expected reaction function dynamics
Given the conditional beliefs at some realized state xt we may form expectations about the next




rr∘ gxftg;c ðzÞ dz ð6Þ
We define the expected reaction dynamics by
xtþ1 ¼ Hc;rðxtÞ for t ¼ 1; 2; N ; ð7Þ




rr∘ gx;cðzÞdz for all 0V xV 1 ð8Þ
Thus instead of focusing on single realizations of the process, the function Hc,σ calculates for
each x∈ [0,1] the expected percentage of the population willing to join given some informational
distribution on the true states. For each σr, Hc,σ represents the “willingness to join” curveFig. 5. Expected reaction functions c=.03.
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dynamics is deterministic, and the interesting question is as to the properties of the equilibria
under formation of expectations given the information component. This amounts to looking at the
fixed points of the mapping Hc,σ and how these fixed points depend on the parameter c. We can
do this for different perfect information response curves, parametrized by σr.
Fig. 5 shows that initially, for small c, three fixed points are present: one is a repulsor and two
are attractors. If the ‘blurriness’ of information increases, however, the dynamics bifurcate to a
single attractor which is higher than the original (lowest) attractor: see Figs. 11 and 12.
5.5. Simulations with negligible spread of information, c= .03
Recall that the standard deviation for B(x) is at most c/√7, approximately 0.011, which would
account for good knowledge about the true state. Figs. 13 and 14 show that for the value σr=0.17
the process stays around the lower expected equilibrium state .1. For the intermediate scenario
with value σr=.32, where around .5 the graph of rσ almost coincides with the line y=x, we find a
clustering of the believed state around .5. Moreover, as can be seen in the left part of the figure, we
observe frequent jumps between the two stable states which points at a highly volatile system. Not
shown are the results for the value σr=.55, where there is only one stable equilibrium at .5. There
is sharp convergence towards this equilibrium state, and the only observed noise is that contained
in the assumed information distribution.
5.6. Simulations with low spread of information, c= .17
This is the most interesting case, as quite different patterns are observed. For the value σr=.17
the probability of jumping over the state x=.5 is still so low that no such occurrence was detected
in the first 104 iterations. The realized states are centered around the lower-left expected
equilibrium value .109. For σr=.21, we have xL(σr)≈ .132, xH(σr)≈1− .132= .868. The first
jump from one side of the middle equilibrium is encountered, followed by a fast convergence
towards the upper-right equilibrium state. Nevertheless, jumps are rare. Figs. 15 (relative
frequency of states) and 16 (realized states) show that, around σr=.26 the system moves
frequently between the two stable equilibria (.198 and .802). These two figures show a similar
behavior for values of σr≈ .32, where the system becomes highly volatile. For larger σr, with one
stable equilibrium left, the noise in the observed states is due to informational assumptions. In
Section 5 we will take a closer look at this phenomenon.
5.7. Simulations with moderate spread of information, c= .32
As can be observed in Figs. 17 and 18, the probability of misinterpreting the true state is
actually so high that the system with three restpoints becomes highly unstable. In the end, with a
large spread of the population over the political spectrum the system settles down around the state
x=.5. In particular this means, in terms of revolution, that anything might happen-anytime.
5.8. Simulations with large spread of information cN .32
The system shows complete diffusion over the spectrum of states between the equilibria; for c
large enough there is even a non-zero probability that the system needs only one iteration to pass
the .5 level. (see Figs. 19 and 20.)
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Recall the two scenarios (c, σr)= (.17,.26) and (c, σr)= (.32,.26), whose long-run distributions
of states can be considered more or less equal, but whose related state diagrams express a clear-cut
difference in volatility. It is in the second scenario, with the larger c, that we find the highest
reluctance of the system to jump to another equilibrium state. From the perspective of the
revolutionaries it is obviously the more promising of the two scenarios, as it guarantees the best
chances for a change of political climate in reasonable time.
We carried out simulations in order to determine the volatility of various scenarios, measured by
the duration of the process to reach a support of at least .5. Again, though we could have chosen
different criteria, it is this focal point which is in line with Kuran's definition of a revolution.
For each combination (c, σr) we performed 10
5 runs; in each we iterated the states xk1;x
k
2; N until
the first moment t(k) such that xt(k)N .5, with a maximum of t(k)=200. Fig. 6 shows the relative
frequencies of the times t(k) for the runs k ¼ 1; N ; 105, and various scenarios.
The horizontal axis in Figs. 6 and 21 denotes the possible ‘revolution times’ (first jumping times).
Starting with the left equilibrium at t=1, the earliest possible revolution time is therefore 2. The
vertical axis measures the relative frequencies of the finishing times. The figure shows that with an
increasing c, i.e., with increasing blurriness of information, early sparks become more likely. With
the low informational level c=.17, the relative frequency of any sparking time is almost zero. Not
surprisingly, with further increasing values of c, sparks accumulate around the first iteration steps.
For low values of both σr and c the dynamics are merely like those of the deterministic system
with f= rσ, meaning that the system hardly gets out of the lower-left equilibrium state.
Interestingly, the influence of the conditional beliefs is increased by a spread of the people over
the political spectrum. Just compare the upper-left diagram with the lower-right diagram to notice
the sensitivity of the revolting times as functions of the parameters c and σr. The scenario σr=.32Fig. 6. Revolting times.
Fig. 7. Polarization and new restpoints at choice of parameters λ=.4, cℓ=.25, σℓ=.12, ch=.7, σh=.13.
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uniform distribution. It is the case where there is hardly drift towards any of the equilibria, as each
state is almost stable for the deterministic dynamics; the sole force underlying the dynamics is the
noise in knowledge about the true state. Any further increase in σrN.32 leads to the situation of a
single deterministically stable state. Because this equilibrium state is actually .5, even for small
values of noise there will be a sharp convergence towards this state.
5.10. Influencing the reaction curve
Recall that the reaction curve can be seen as a cumulative distribution function of the mass
over the complete political spectrum. The value rσ(0) represents a group of people that will
always be on the side of the opposition; private preferences dictate each of these individuals to
remain loyal although they might not be able to enjoy the light of revolution. Also on the regime's
side one finds the fraction 1− rσ(1) of the population who will always be waiting for decay of the
opposition, whatever the number of people is that put all their confidence in the adversaries. The
S-shape reaction curve furthermore indicates that most of the people are concentrated in the
middle of the political spectrum, and in particular it shows that most people have no strict
preferences. Winning the war means – for both sides – that it is these people that are tilted in their
decision. The former section shows that the prospects for a revolutionary movement increase
sharply with the diversity of political preference— at least compared to the situation with people
centered at .5. Below we will argue that a terrorist action may actually affect the two basics of our
dynamics; it will have an impact on the believed state of the world and reshape the threshold
function by dictating new aggregate levels of preference. To appreciate the focus on changes in
the reaction function, consider a purely deterministic system. In the numerical examples we have
shown that small changes of the spread of the political spectrum σr≈ .32 can have enormous
impact on the system's equilibrium properties. McCormick and Owen (1996) and Kuran (1989,
1991a,b) each point at diametrically different results, depending on just a small change in kurtosis
of the population distribution over the political spectrum6. Whoever is capable of influencing this
spread has a powerful weapon to invoke the system to adjust in the desired direction. However,
although this factor is certainly not to be neglected, we will illustrate that it is probably not the6Kuran suggests that revolutionary actions come in the wake of historic opportunities, while McCormick and Owen feel
that historic opportunities can be generated by revolutionary actions.
Fig. 8. Sharp polarization: three stable and two unstable equilibria at values of the parameters λ=.3, cℓ=.2, σℓ=.04,
ch=.6, σh=.15.
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the observed kind of attacks worthwhile for insurgent networks. Belowwewill argue that it is indeed
a combination of effects that could resolve a misunderstood part in explaining terrorist actions.
Actions from either side of the political centermay induce the people to sharpen their preferences.
Recent terrorist attacks by Al Qaida members immediately caused a polarization of the mass into
different camps. In Western Europe, the recent bloody assassinations of civilians caused a dramatic
shift in sentiment resulting in what were believed to be counter-attacks on Islamic schools. This in
turn mobilized part of the Islamic societies to oppose such reactions. This is to say that up to some
years ago an S-shaped curve would not misrepresent the actual political spectrum as the aggregate of
the different types of populations that lived in peace together. However homogeneous society may
have looked from the outside, the latest actions caused shifts within several cultural and ethnic
groups. Where nonnegligible groups of Islamic youth are found to radicalize at enormous speed, the
cry for a firm and active government indicates a shift in the opposite direction. Then, where an S-
shape curve might not fit an accurate realistic dynamic adjustment model, perhaps a double S-shape
will. This is illustrated below in Fig. 7 with two peaks in the political spectrum, one in support of the
revolutionaries and the other in favor of the government.
In particular, there are now more equilibria, three of which are stable and two unstable. Of
interest is this new intermediate equilibrium that is more easily reached for a small revolutionary
movement than the upright equilibrium position. In absolute terms, following Kuran's
terminology, such action would bring the opposition closer to the desired revolution.Fig. 9. Overshooting effect: one equilibrium at choice parameters λ=.2, cℓ=.25, σℓ=.12, ch=.6, σh=.13.
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The discussed distortions of the reaction function can easily be modeled by weighing two
types of realization functions: for λ∈ (0,1) we define
rkðxÞ ¼ aþ ð1 2aÞ½kUðx; cS rS ÞÞ þ ð1 kÞUðx; ch;rhÞ ð9Þ
Such a weighted function may result from aggregating preferences in a heterogeneous
population, where cultural as well as social differences may lead to several reaction functions. The
weight may be then be interpreted as the mass of the people belonging to a specific subgroup in
society. Fig. 7 shows the reaction function rλ for a dichotomous society resulting from mixing the
related CDF's given by the normal distributions NðcS rS Þ ¼ Nð:25; :12Þ and N(ch,σh)=N(.7,.13),
respectively, with weight λ=.4.
The stable equilibrium values are approximately xL≈ .12, xM≈ .42, and xH≈ .88. Thus the
value xM results from an action of the revolutionaries. In between these equilibria we find the
unstable ones at .25 and .72.
Now consider the figures below that result from small variations on the above example and
note that the number of equilibria and their respective values are highly sensitive to these changes.
Fig. 8 may be still be compared with Fig. 7 in a topological sense, as far as the number of
equilibria and their respective values are concerned. In Fig. 9 dramatic changes of these
characteristics have occurred, as it leaves the opposition in a deterministic dynamical system with
only the ‘bad’ outcome xL≈ .26. Then this will probably not be enough for a revolutionary shift of
power — although still this value is higher than the original lower equilibrium value xL=.12. In
other words, if the shift to the left is not imminent, the action should have devastating effects for
the insurgent network, as the downwards pulling reaction curve would lead to an inferior
outcome. Then if the relation between the parameters and the level of action is assumed to be of
this sensitive kind, why would terrorists employ attacks?
Though a general answer to this question may not exist, one possible explanation could be the
psychological effects of a terrorist attack. First of all, it leaves bewildered many people that would
not expect an attack as nearby as was accomplished. It is this (large) group of people that puts
confidence in those that are supposed to lead and bring a solution — the governmental
institutions. A solution, however, is not achievable, at least not shortly after the action. As a result
the reigning power will not get the massive support that one would reckon, which might be just
the effect desired by insurgent groups. This leads us to conclude that Fig. 8 seems more adequate
as an explanation for the terrorists' rationale than Fig. 9. (Of course the terrorists may be wrong,
Fig. 9 might well be the case, and the organization will be badly hurt.)
5.12. Indirect power of information
The shift in mass has another very important indirect effect, and that is that for the new reaction
function r̆ the values r̆ (x) are closer to x. Figs. 8 and 7 display such equalizing effects due to
shifts in sentiment. Earlier discussions already pointed at the fact that an equal spread of the
population minimizes the effect of pulling down the believed state to a lower real state of the
world. Each point is an approximate restpoint, such that effects of information about the real state
of the world gain impact. Propaganda on top of a terrorist action may thus close the gap. This
could be just a lucky shot strategy — just wait and see what happens: the information gap might
close the distance towards a better restpoint.
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Wehave presented a dynamic framework bywhich themassmobilization problem is discussed in
the context of revolutionary movements. In particular the model generalizes other theoretical work
by explicitly modeling the beliefs that people might hold about the actual political state of the world
as far as their willingness to openly support the revolutionaries is concerned. Amajor finding is that a
lack ofknowledge about the actual level of support is an important source of growth of support for
insurgent networks, in particular in the case of a widespread political sentiment. Terrorist actions
may serve the revolutionary movement in different ways. First, they increase the range of believed
true states as the revolutionary movement signals not only its existence but even its strength. Our
examples show that the likeliness of revolution increases with an increase of noise in believed states.
Secondly, an important effect is that terror has an equalizing effect on political preferences. Then, the
private threshold values beingmore uniformly distributed, former considerations show an increasing
impact of the informational component. In turn, this combination of effects may lead to strong and
sudden shifts in sentiment, pulling society over to join the revolutionaries. The effects may be even
stronger because the speed atwhich changes occurmay have amore serious impact on the proportion
of hardcore membership than suggested here. Any firm basis of support creates a new and increased
stable state as status quo, with better sight on the tipping point. In any case, reasons that lead a
revolutionary group to victory may as well be the main cause of its failure after installment in power.
If the combination of action and lack of information has been themain reason for the jump to another
equilibrium, then such phenomena may as well— and just as easily-lead to a jump back. This might
explain why revolution often has a follow-up in repression.
Appendix A. Implementation of the dynamics using Mathematica
In order to modify this random generator for our purposes we shall use a transformation
technique Y=h(Z), i.e., for a given random variable Z we seek a function h such that Y has a
cumulative distribution as prescribed in the last section. The following theorem is taken from
Mood et al. (1961), Theorem 11 page 200, tailored to our purposes.
Theorem. Suppose Z is a continuous random variable with values in [0,1] and probability
density function fZ (•). Set Z={z| fZ (z)N0}. Assume that
1. y=h(z) defines a one-to-one transformation Z→ [0,1],
2. The derivative of z=h−1(y) with respect to y is continuous and nonzero for y∈ [0,1],
where h−1 is the inverse function of h. Then Y=h(Z) is a continuous random variable
with density
f yð yÞ ¼ jdh1ð yÞ=dyj f zðh1ð yÞÞ: ðA:1Þ
We first seek the function h such that, when Z⊂ [0,1], Y=h(Z) has cumulative distribution




gx;cðsÞds if x cV yV xþ c ðA:2Þ
Note that in the above theorem we may put fZ (z)=1 for all z∈ [0,1], so that Eq. (A.1) becomes
fyðyÞ ¼ jdh1ðyÞ=dyj for all ya½0; 1: ðA:3Þ
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fyðyÞ ¼ jdFx;sðyÞ=dyj ¼ gx;cðyÞ ðA:4Þ
Assume for the moment that h−1 exists and that dh−1(y)/dy is positive. Then the function h is
the inverse of the function Fx,c, which exists since gx,c(y)N0 for y∈ (x−c,x+c). It is easily
checked that this function h has all the properties required by in Theorem A.1. Moreover, note
that calculating values of h involves finding roots of a polynomial of degree 5, which is easily
done in both Matlab and Mathematica. Thus, we are able to calculate the function
h⁎ðzÞ ¼ maxfminfhðzÞ; 1gg; 0g ðA:5Þ
which has all the properties we need.
Then the pseudocode for one iteration from xt to xt+1 consists of the following steps:
[Step 1] Use Random to generate a random number z∈ [0,1] according to the uniform
distribution.
[Step 2] Compute h⁎(z).
[Step 3] Compute r(h⁎(z))
Appendix B. Figures
B.1. Simulations
The figures below show the data obtained by 1000 runs of 1000 iteration steps. We counted the
relative frequency of states in 103 subintervals of type [ak,ak+1], with equidistant points
a1; a1; N , such that .1 ¼ a0ba1b N ba999ba1000 ¼ :9.
Fig. 10. Bifurcation at σr≈ .32.
72 M. Koster et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 55 (2008) 55–77Fig. 11. Expected reaction function c=.16.Fig. 12. Expected reaction function c=.16.Fig. 13. Relative frequency of states, small spread of information c=.03.
73M. Koster et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 55 (2008) 55–77Fig. 14. Realized states, small spread of info c=.03.Fig. 15. Relative frequency of states, moderate spread of info c=.17.
74 M. Koster et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 55 (2008) 55–77Fig. 16. Realized states, moderate spread of information c=.17.Fig. 17. Relative frequency of states, large spread of info c= .32.
75M. Koster et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 55 (2008) 55–77Fig. 18. Realized states, large spread of information c= .32.Fig. 19. Relative frequency of states under huge spread of information, c= .55.
76 M. Koster et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 55 (2008) 55–77Fig. 20. Realized states under huge spread of information, c=.55.Fig. 21. Revolting times, ordered by beliefs.
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